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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE SWEDISH SOLUTION 
George W. Dent, Jr.

 
Abstract 
The optimal allocation of authority among executives, directors, and 
shareholders of public companies has been debated as long as there 
have been public companies, and the issue now seems further from 
resolution than ever. In recent years Sweden has changed its corporate 
governance system by delegating the nomination of corporate directors 
(and thus, in effect, ultimate control) to committees typically 
comprising representatives of each company’s largest shareholders. 
This system gives shareholders a degree of power “that only the most 
daring corporate governance initiatives in the rest of the world could 
even imagine.”1 The change is a big success—it has pleased many 
corporate constituencies without upsetting any. Part I of this Article 
describes that change and some similar developments in other countries. 
Part II discusses whether the Swedish model can work in America and 
concludes that it can. Part III offers two promising ways to move toward 
shareholder primacy. 
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I.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SWEDEN 
(WITH NOTES ON SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES) 
A.  Sweden 
Traditionally, most public Swedish corporations were dominated by 
a few large shareholders.
2
 Their power stemmed largely from owning 
stock with higher voting than financial rights.
3
 CEOs had much less 
influence than they do in the United States.
4
 However, the influence of 
most prominent families has now waned.
5
 Foreign ownership (mainly 
by British and American institutional investors) of publicly traded 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See Ulf Larsson-Olaison, The Translation of Transplanted Rules: The Case of the 
Swedish Nomination Committee, in INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN THE GLOBAL WORLD: FROM 
PARTICULARISM TO A UNIVERSAL APPROACH 325, 331 (J. Jemielniak & P. Miklaszewicz, eds., 
2010) (“[M]any Swedish firms are controlled by so-called spheres . . . . These spheres are often 
tied to a family . . . .”); Daniel Johanson & Katarina Østergren, The Movement Toward 
Independent Directors on Boards: A Comparative Analysis of Sweden and the UK, 18 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 527, 532 (2010) (stating that “[t]wo business groups have 
historically dominated Swedish industry”). A study published in 2003 showed that 26.3% of 
public companies in Sweden had a majority control block and 64.2% had a shareholder with at 
least 25%. Marco Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers 19 figs.1 & 2 (ECGI Working Paper Series in 
Law No. 14/2003, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=463003. 
 3.  See Magnus Engvall & Christian Holmberg, Nomination Committees, Pension Funds 
and Board Turnover: Evidence from the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 6 (May 30, 
2007) (unpublished Master thesis, Stockholm School of Economics), available at 
http://www.essays.se/essay/cbb3bb0fe8 (“[T]he Swedish setting is characterized by many 
owners with large control (voting) rights in proportion to cash flow (dividend) rights.”). Dual 
class common stock existed at 66% of Swedish companies. See Becht, supra note 2, at tbl.2. 
However, even in 2003 there was virtually no difference in market value between high-voting 
and low-voting shares. See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: 
A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 331, 340 (2003) (finding a difference of only 
1%). This suggests that voting power cannot generate personal benefits for the owner. 
 4. See Engvall & Holmberg, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that “the CEO has a larger impact 
on board election” in the U.S. than in Sweden); Larsson-Olaison, supra note 2, at 332 (stating 
that “managerial influence on board work is not the main problem in Sweden”). 
 5. See Paolo Santella et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Obstacles to 
Institutional Investor Activism in the EU and in the US, 23 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 257, 261 (2012); 
TOMORROW’S CO., TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BRIDGING THE UK ENGAGEMENT 
GAP THROUGH SWEDISH-STYLE NOMINATION COMMITTEES 13 (“Today . . . Swedish pension 
funds, mutual funds and industrial holding companies are commonly among the largest 
shareholders of companies. As well as the local institutional shareholders, foreign institutions 
own a significant proportion of the market.”) [hereinafter TOMORROW’S CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE]. 
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Swedish stock has grown and is now 40% of the total.
6
 Previously, 
conflicts between minority and large shareholders were not uncommon.
7
 
In 1993, the Swedish Shareholders’ Association, an organization of 
small shareholders, began to agitate for a larger role in governance for 
other stockholders.
8
 The initiative met resistance.
9
 
In 2004, the Swedish Corporate Governance Code (CGC)—a body 
of law promulgated by a private group called the Swedish Corporate 
Governance Board—was revised. Unlike the Companies Act, the CGC 
is not mandatory, but most public companies hew to it.
10
 The CGC 
provides that the Annual General Meeting of shareholders (AGM) 
appoints a nominating committee (NC), comprised of a majority of non-
board members and devoid of any members from management,
11
 to 
present the next AGM with a slate of nominees for the board.
12
 This 
arrangement starkly contrasts with the practices of the United States and 
Britain, where the nominating committee is almost invariably a 
subcommittee of the board—inevitably resulting in a system where 
boards tend to be self-perpetuating.
13
 
Generally members of the NC “represent the company’s major 
owners,” although “at least one member must be independent of the 
company’s largest shareholders.”14 The NC has “responsibility for 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See Per Lekvall, The Swedish Corporate Governance Model, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 368, 375, available at 
http://www.bolagsstyrning.se/media/28166/the%20swedish%20corporate%20governance%20m 
odel%20-%20article%20in%20the%20iod%20handbook%202009.pdf;  Rolf H. Carlsson, 
Swedish Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Owners Still in the Driver’s Seat, 15 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 1038, 1039 (2007) (stating that foreign ownership 
now varies from 35% to 40%). 
 7. See Johanson & Østergren, supra note 2, at 531. 
 8. See Larsson-Olaison, supra note 2, at 333; Thomas Poulsen et al., Voting Power and 
Shareholder Activism: A Study of Swedish Shareholder Meetings, 18 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
AN INT’L REV. 329, 331 (2010). 
 9. See Larsson-Olaison, supra note 2, at 334–35. 
 10. See SWED. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BD., THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE 5 (2010), available at http://www.corporategovernanceboard.se/media/45322/svenskkodb 
olagsstyrn_2010_eng_korrigerad20110321.pdf [hereinafter THE SWEDISH CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CODE]. 
 11. See THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 10, at Corp. Gov. Code 
§§ 2.3–2.4 (2010). 
 12. See id. at 14; Larsson-Olaison, supra note 2, at 336. The name of the committee is 
variously translated into English as “nominating committee,” “nomination committee,” or 
“election committee.” 
 13. In the United States, shareholders cannot place nominees for the board in the 
corporate proxy statement. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. Accordingly, 
shareholders can challenge the board’s own nominees only by waging proxy fights, which are 
extremely expensive and, hence, extremely rare. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 14. See B. Espen Eckbo et al., Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on Sweden 31 
(ECGI Working Paper Series in Law No. 173/2011, 2011), available at 
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finding the right people to serve on boards,”15 and so many NCs retain 
professional search consultants to assist them in this task.
16
 “The CEO 
and other members of the executive management cannot be members of 
the committee. The chairman and other members of the board can be 
members of the committee . . . .”17 Most NCs have five members, and 
“[n]ormally the largest shareholders are entitled to appoint one member 
each.”18 “The Swedish Shareholder Association, which represents small 
investors, is granted a seat on behalf of these small shareholders in 
several firms . . . .”19 “In most companies the shareholders forming the 
[nominating committee] will account for 15–25% of the votes to be 
cast . . . .”20 In some cases, institutions will purchase stock in a company 
for the express purpose of seeking representation on its nominating 
committee.
21
 “[M]embers of the nomination committee are to promote 
the interests of all shareholders.”22 As a consequence, “the traditional 
owners have to share their influence with other types of owners (i.e., 
local institutional investors).”23 
The Annual General Meeting is not just an event, but an institution; 
it “stands at the peak of a governance hierarchy,”24 “with the board 
being fully subordinate to the AGM.”25 “The shareholders’ meeting is a 
limited company’s highest decision-making body . . . . [T]he 
shareholders’ meeting has a sovereign role over the board of directors 
                                                                                                                     
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1651582. 
 15. TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 3. The committee 
sometimes interviews potential directors and people who have worked with them. Id. at 21.  
 16. PER LEKVALL, SWED. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BD., NOMINATION COMMITTEES IN 
SWEDISH LISTED COMPANIES 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.corporategovernanceboard.se 
/media/1531/nomination%20committees%20in%20swedish%20listed%20companies%20-%20a 
rtikel%20i%20icgn%20yearbook%202008.pdf. 
 17. Eckbo et al., supra note 14, at 31–32; see also Poulsen et al., supra note 8, at 331 
(“[T]he chairman of the board is invited to participate for informational reasons.”). 
 18. Eckbo et al., supra note 14, at 32; see also TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
supra note 5, at 20 (“The [nominating committee] usually comprises representatives of the four 
or five largest shareholders and the chairman of the board.”). 
 19. Poulsen et al., supra note 8, at 332. 
 20. TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 20. 
 21. See, e.g., Engvall & Holmberg, supra note 3, at 2 (citing the purchase by Cevian 
Capital of stock in Volvo). 
 22. THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 10, at 14; Eckbo et al., 
supra note 14, at 31 (citing THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE). 
 23. Larsson-Olaison, supra note 2, at 346. 
 24. TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 4. The real power of the 
AGM in Sweden contrasts with its status in many other European countries where most 
companies are dominated by a few shareholders and AGMs “are often seen only as rituals . . . or 
‘annual headaches.’” Poulsen et al., supra note 8, at 330. 
 25. LEKVALL, supra note 16, at 1. 
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and the chief executive officer.”26 It has “exclusive decision-making 
powers on certain matters, e.g. changes to the articles of association, 
election of board members and auditor and adoption of the balance 
sheet and income statement.”27 “The board is obliged to follow any 
specific directives passed by the shareholders’ meeting, providing these 
do not contravene” the law or the corporation’s charter.28 
In addition to its control of the company through the nomination 
committee, the AGM “can, if necessary, issue instructions to the 
board.”29 Although the nominating committee also recommends the 
company auditor and the remuneration of each member of the Board of 
Directors,
30
 the ultimate decision on remuneration lies with the AGM.
31
 
The auditor reports to the AGM and, in addition to the usual audit 
functions, has a duty “to review the performance of the board and the 
CEO.”32 The auditor’s report must state “if any board member or the 
CEO has acted in a way that may give cause for liability for 
damages.”33 The board has a remuneration committee to set the 
compensation for executives, but its members are chosen by the AGM 
and “are to be independent of the company and its executive 
management.”34 The NC also evaluates the performance of directors, 
often with the participation of outside professionals.
35
 “Boards are 
subordinate to the AGM and the executive subordinate to the board—so 
it may be said that the Swedish system is ‘owner-centric.’”36 
Shareholder primacy is also ensured by specific rules. For instance, 
the Corporate Governance Code states: “Share- and share-price-related 
incentive programmes are to be designed with the aim of achieving 
increased alignment between the interests of the participating individual 
and the company’s shareholders.”37 Moreover, equity compensation 
plans (such as stock options) for executives must be approved by a 
ninety percent vote of the shareholders!
38
 
                                                                                                                     
 26. THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 10, at 9. 
 27. Id. at 10. 
 28. Id. 
 29. TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
 30. THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 10, at 14. 
 31. In particular, “[t]he shareholders’ meeting is to decide on all share and share-price 
related incentive schemes for the executive management.” Id. at 23. 
 32. Lekvall, supra note 6, at 372. 
 33. Id. 
 34. TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 22. 
 35. See Carlsson, supra note 6, at 1049; see also TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
supra note 5, at 21 (“In some cases committee members will interview each director to help 
them make their own evaluations . . . . In undertaking their evaluation, boards are most likely to 
use an external consultant once every two or three years.”). 
 36. TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 14. 
 37. THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 10, at 23. 
 38. Aktiebolagslagen [The Swedish Companies Act], ch.16, § 8 (2005:551). 
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Despite the initial opposition to greater power for outside investors, 
the new system quickly achieved wide acceptance—even when a 
nominating committee recommended the termination of five directors of 
one company.
39
 The transformation was so well-received “it is almost as 
if nobody ever opposed the nomination committee concept.”40 In some 
cases, this happened even before the revision of the Corporate 
Governance Code. For example, Volvo—one of the few Swedish 
companies “not connected to an ownership sphere and thereby 
traditionally regarded as being under managerial control”41—instituted 
an election committee “composed of representatives of large 
institutional investors with no directors included” in 1998.42 The change 
precipitated no strife. 
The new system has been implemented with very little turmoil. 
“Typically, the nominees to the board listed in the [AGM] agenda are 
the ones proposed by the nomination committee,” and no shareholder 
proposes opponents.
43
 Investors are not at each other’s throats. 
Managers who consider the choices of the NC to lack proper vision or 
knowledge could offer an opposing slate at the AGM and solicit proxies 
on its behalf, but they rarely do so.
44
 Disputes seem to be fairly rare and 
minor.
45
 In general, “[NCs] function as a vehicle for . . . negotiated 
compromises between small shareholders and controlling 
shareholders.”46 “While large shareholders generally have a dominating 
position in the nomination committee, the rationale for electing the 
committee at the annual general meeting is precisely to give small 
shareholders a say (large shareholders could easily meet in private if 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 18 (stating that 
shareholders of TeliaSonera “overwhelmingly supported” the move). 
 40. Larsson-Olaison, supra note 2, at 337. 
 41. Id.; Carlsson, supra note 6, at 1049 (“The new practice is strongly supported by most 
institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds providing opportunities for them to 
have an impact on board composition.”). 
 42. Larsson-Olaison, supra note 2, at 337–38. 
 43. See Eckbo et al., supra note 14, at 34. 
 44. See TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 19 (“Counter-proposals 
were a feature of shareholder meetings twenty years ago or so, but now are rare.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Engvall & Holmberg, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that the purchase by Cevian 
Capital of a large stake in Volvo in order to take a seat on its nomination committee “met strong 
resistance from, among others, Swedish pension funds”). Engvall and Holmberg also claim that 
“conflicting interests that can occur between controlling owners that can extract private benefits 
and non-controlling owners.” Id. at 34. However, their only evidence of friction is that 
representation of pension funds on Swedish nominating committees has resulted in higher board 
turnover in smaller public companies. See id. The traditional controlling owners may not 
welcome these changes, but they seem to be accepting them as they occur. See supra notes 39–
42 and accompanying text; infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 46. Poulsen et al., supra note 8, at 329. 
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they desired).”47 
What of “short-termism,” the bugaboo of critics of shareholder 
primacy in the United States? 
[T]his is rarely seen as an issue in practice. Instead, the 
annual cycle is viewed positively as a regular opportunity 
for shareholders to confirm they are happy with the 
direction the company is going. Two factors contribute to 
this outcome. First, the members of the nomination 
committee usually are taking a longer-term view and are 
not striving for quick gains . . . . Secondly, the hierarchy in 
the Swedish system makes it clear that a [nominating 
committee] is not taking over the job of a board. Strategic 
decisions are delegated to the board and the shareholders 
have no say in those decisions . . . .
48
 
In fact, “active shareholder engagement in the nomination process has 
increased confidence in the board function . . . .”49 The system “puts 
extra pressure on the board of directors to . . . create more value for the 
shareholders.”50 
It also does not seem to be a major problem that shareholders with 
representatives on the NC become, to some extent, insiders. At first 
glance, such a structure of governance would seem to pose two inherent 
problems. First, these shareholders might on occasion have inside 
information about the company and therefore be forbidden to trade in its 
stock. However, the NC does not meet very often and it does not get 
much material nonpublic information, so “the risk of being an insider 
does not materialise very often.”51 Moreover, an investor concerned 
about such a problem could decline to appoint a representative or could 
have its representative resign. Alternatively, the representative can 
simply not transmit inside information to the investor. 
The second inherent problem posed by insider status is the potential 
for investors to exploit their NC representation through preferential self-
dealing with the company. However, there is no evidence that this has 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. at 331–32. 
 48. TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 26. However, “[a] 
shareholder with a short-term strategy can influence the discussions at the [nominating 
committee], and may succeed in getting a sympathetic director appointed to the board, but only 
when they have convinced the [committee] and ultimately, the AGM.” Id. at 32. Rolf Carlsson 
has expressed concerns about use of the NC by “short term activist[s]” to achieve their goals. 
Carlsson, supra note 6, at 1049–50. However, I have not found even an allegation of an incident 
where a company was damaged by such behavior. Moreover, despite this reservation, Carlsson 
favors retention of the NC system. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 49. TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 4. 
 50. Id. at 25 (quoting an interviewee). 
 51. Id. at 33. 
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been an actual problem—or even perceived as a serious potential 
problem—in Sweden. That is not surprising.52 First, most large 
shareholders (like pension funds) do not have any activities that would 
lend themselves to self-dealing with an industrial company. The private 
benefits of having a representative on the NC are so meager that some 
eligible shareholders decline the opportunity.
53
 Second, other members 
of the NC and all members of the board and executive management 
could be expected to know of, and object to, such self-dealing. Lastly, 
other shareholders could also be expected to know of an investor’s 
potential for self-dealing. Although it is customary to give the largest 
shareholders representation on the NC, it is not mandatory. If the other 
shareholders fear self-dealing by a particular shareholder, they can 
simply deny that shareholder representation on the NC. 
In some respects, the Swedes actually regulate conflicts of interest 
more rigorously than Americans do. For instance, if the board or its 
remuneration committee “uses the services of an external consultant, it 
is to ensure that there is no conflict of interest regarding other 
assignments this consultant may have for the company or its executive 
management.”54 By contrast, such conflicts of interest of compensation 
consultants are common in the U.S.
55
 
In sum: 
[T]he quality of board nomination processes in Swedish 
companies has improved significantly over the last few 
                                                                                                                     
 52. In considering this problem, it is significant that the movement to change Swedish 
corporate governance was initiated by an association of small shareholders. See supra note 8 
and accompanying text. 
 53. See Carlsson, supra note 6, at 1049 (“Some foreign institutional investors have chosen 
not to take a seat on the nomination committee . . . .”). 
 54. THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 10, at 23. The similar 
Danish system has statutes curbing self-dealing. See Danish Companies Act § 80; Hansen, supra 
note 1, at 71 (stating of this provision that “the shareholders holding a majority of votes at the 
general [shareholder] meeting may not abuse their powers to the detriment of minority 
shareholder or of the company in general”). 
 55. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Corporate America’s Pay Pal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2006, § 3, at 1 (chronicling how one consulting firm repeatedly boosted executive compensation 
for over 1,800 clients); Gretchen Morgenson, Advice on Boss’s Pay May Not be so Independent, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A1 (discussing the “long and lucrative relationship” between one 
executive compensation consulting firm and its client); James D. Cox, Fair Pay for Chief 
Executive Officers, in LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR 99, 106 (P.D. 
Carrington & T. Jones eds., 2006) (“The role of the compensation consultant is fraught with 
conflicting interests . . . .”). As a result, use of consultants tends to inflate compensation. See 
Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and “Independent” Compensation 
Consultants, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 247, 248 & n.2 (2010); Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, 
Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 63–64 (2007) (“[M]anagers use the compensation consultants as 
‘camouflage’ to extract premium rents from the compensation committee.”). 
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years. The ‘old boys’ network’ criticism of just a few years 
ago has all but vanished . . . . There is little or no support in 
the Swedish business community and securities market for 
a change towards the concept of a subcommittee of the 
board nominating board members. The present model is 
generally considered to work well and be better adapted to 
the Swedish governance system.
56
 
Comparing the two systems, one Swedish commentator provided the 
following critique: 
[I]n some countries companies are controlled by their 
executive management. Such cases are the US 
corporations . . . . [T]he Board . . . to a large extent is 
dominated by the Chairman/CEO. Shareholders experience 
all kinds of impediments to get any real influence on board 
nominations and elections.
57
 
A Danish scholar says that the American corporate governance system 
“would seem to look upon shareholders much as landowners looked on 
peasants in pre-revolutionary Russia.”58 
The Swedish Corporate Governance Board explicitly recognizes its 
investor-centered governance system as a weapon in the struggle to 
attract investment capital: 
Good corporate governance is a question of ensuring that 
companies are run as efficiently as possible on behalf of 
their shareholders. The confidence of existing and potential 
shareholders that such is the case is crucial to their interest 
in investing in companies, thus securing corporate 
Sweden’s supply of risk capital.59 
The Swedish economy “is currently a star performer, with economic 
growth faster than that of any other wealthy nation . . . .”60 Of course, 
Sweden’s robust growth cannot be ascribed solely to its corporate 
governance system, but it is suggestive. 
                                                                                                                     
 56. LEKVALL, supra note 16, at 2; see also Carlsson, supra note 6, at 1050 (“There are 
scattered voices in favour of Sweden following the Anglo-Saxon practice of including the 
nomination committee as part of the board. Fortunately, a solid majority is against such abuse of 
sound corporate governance principles.”). 
 57. Carlsson, supra note 6, at 1051. 
 58. Hansen, supra note 1, at 75. 
 59. THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 10, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 60. Paul Krugman, What Ails Europe?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at A19. 
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B.  Corporate Governance in Other Foreign Countries 
Although the primary focus of this Article is on Sweden, it should be 
noted that Sweden is not unique in its treatment of shareholders of 
public companies. The Nordic countries generally favor shareholder 
primacy.
61
 In Europe it is well-established that “it is the general meeting 
[of shareholders] that decides on fundamental matters, such as the 
alteration of the articles.”62 As in Sweden,63 European shareholders are 
not at each other’s throats, but rather all voting matters tend to 
“receive[] overwhelming support of the shareholders.”64 In 2007, the 
European Shareholders Directive was issued, with the aim “to allow 
shareholders effectively to make use of their rights throughout the 
[European] Community.”65 The directive has lowered legal obstacles to 
proxy voting in the European Union
66
 and has only furthered European 
shareholder primacy. 
Britain also treats shareholders well:  
Shareholders in the United Kingdom are, in fact, far more 
powerful, and far more central to the aims of the 
corporation than are shareholders in the United States. U.K. 
shareholders possess considerably greater corporate 
governance authority and capacity to discipline errant 
officers and directors. In addition, U.K. shareholders 
benefit from fiduciary duties and a conception of corporate 
purpose that focuses far more clearly on their interests than 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 69 (“[T]he shareholder does enjoy an unrivalled position 
of power within Nordic limited companies, a position that only the most daring corporate 
governance initiatives in the rest of the world could even imagine.”). 
 62. A. DORRESTEIJN, EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 193 (2009). In some countries the AGM 
also decides on dividends. See Christoph Van der Elst, Shareholder Rights and Shareholder 
Activism: The Role of the General Meeting of Shareholders 9 (ECGI Working Paper Series in 
Law No. 188/2012, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017691. The AGM also 
generally fixes the remuneration of the directors. See id. at 13–15; see also id. at 18 (“[I]n some 
countries the general meeting is provided with specific rights regarding transactions between 
corporate incumbents and the company.”). Even Japanese law, which traditionally gave 
shareholders very little power, is now “friendlier to hostile [takeover] bids than Delaware law.” 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law 2 
(Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 449, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2095419. 
 63. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 64. Van der Elst, supra note 62, at 28. 
 65. Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies 17, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:184:0017:0024:EN:PDF. 
Legislation pending in Switzerland would also enhance the shareholder role in corporate 
governance. See Benedict F. Christ, How Activist Shareholders May Profit from Proposed 
Changes to Swiss Corporate Law, 5 CORP. M&A NEWSLETTER 50 (Sept. 2012). 
 66. See Santella et al., supra note 5, at 301. 
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is the case in any U.S. state—including Delaware . . . . The 
practical consequence is that U.K. shareholders loom much 
larger in the boardroom than U.S. shareholders do.
67
 
As a result, relations between shareholders and managers are less 
contentious in Britain than here.
68
  
In fact, American shareholders’ rights are much weaker than those in 
many other developed countries.
69
 Australia and Canada allow 
shareholders to place nominations for the board of directors on the 
corporate proxy statement,
70
 a privilege not extended to American 
shareholders.
71
 In other countries, shareholders have the power to 
amend the certificate of incorporation without board approval and to 
call special shareholder meetings.
72
 Shareholders of Delaware 
corporations lack these powers.
73
 In Denmark, shareholders must 
approve substantial corporate gifts.
74
 This is significant because 
American CEOs often use corporate gifts to suborn supposedly 
independent directors.
75
  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 581–82 (2010). The British government has now proposed a binding 
shareholder vote on executive compensation. See Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Alert 
Memo: Binding Shareholder Say-on-Pay Vote on Route to Reality in the UK: US Companies 
Take Note (July 9, 2012), available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/3b4b3be5-0f26-49ce-
9c95-0bfd5207e8df/Presentation/NewsAttachment/2339ed13-5b2d-4e59-9830-0ce4ed80a645 
/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20Gov%20UK%20Binding%20Say%20on%20Pay.pdf. 
 68. See Santella et al., supra note 5, at 1 (“We also find through descriptive statistics that 
institutional investors in the US seem to have a more adversarial voting pattern vis-à-vis 
company managements than in the UK; this might be due to the fewer voting rights given to 
shareholders by the US regulatory framework.”). 
 69. See Santella et al., supra note 5, at 275, 301. 
 70. See Robert McDermott & Sean Farrell, Overview of Recent Corporate Governance 
Reforms, GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDE 2004, http://www.globalcorporategovernanc 
e.com/n_namericas/134_140.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2012). 
 71. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Jennifer Hill, Evolving ‘Rules of the Game’ in Corporate Governance Reform, 1 
INT’L J. CORP. GOV. 28 (2008); Hansen, supra note 1, at 71 (stating that shareholders owning 
over 10% of the stock of Danish public companies can compel the board to convene a special 
shareholder meeting within two weeks). 
 73. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2009) (“Special meetings of the stockholders 
may be called by the board of directors . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2010) 
(stating that an amendment of the certificate of incorporation requires first a resolution of the 
board and then majority shareholder approval). 
 74. See Danish Companies Act § 195; Hansen, supra note 1, at 73 (discussing this 
provision). 
 75. See George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and 
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1241–43 (2008) 
[hereinafter Dent, Academics in Wonderland]. 
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The supposedly sovereign power of American shareholders through 
voting is nothing more than an illusion.
76
 Shareholder rights in the 
United States are so weak that Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. changed 
its incorporation from Australia to Delaware: “gaining access to 
Delaware’s pro-managerial governance regime was an important aspect 
of the reincorporation decision.”77 “The net result of News Corp.’s 
move from Australia to Delaware was an appreciable reduction in 
shareholder rights and an enhancement of managerial powers, including 
the power to implement ‘poison pills’—a power unavailable in 
Australia.”78 
II.  THE RELEVANCE OF THE SWEDISH EXPERIENCE TO THE UNITED 
STATES 
All of the evidence suggests that shareholder primacy works well for 
Sweden. This Part considers possible arguments as to why it would not 
work well in the United States, and in turn rebuts each of those 
arguments. 
A.  Shareholder Conflicts 
One possible objection is that American “investors are dispersed, 
diverse and wholly unused to playing nomination roles even if 
companies were eager to test drive the [Swedish] practice.”79 This 
criticism seems unfounded. First, the physical dispersion of investors is 
unimportant in the age of electronic communication. The significance of 
their physical dispersion has been further reduced by the rise of proxy 
advisory services, which serve as de facto coordinators of proxy voting 
by institutional investors.
80
 In turn, “institutional investors decrease 
information asymmetry” between management and shareholders.81 
Moreover, Swedish investors are at least as physically dispersed as 
American shareholders. Forty percent of public company shares are 
held by foreign investors, many of which are American.
82
 Finally, stock 
ownership in U.S. companies has been shown to be more concentrated 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 701 
(2007). 
 77. Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s 
Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1, 50 (2010). 
 78. Id. at 49. 
 79. Stephen Davis & Jon Lukomnik, Seeking Governance Inspiration—From Sweden? 7 
COMPLIANCE WEEK 1, 2 (2010), available at http://vlex.com/vid/seeking-governance-
inspiration-sweden-229656983. 
 80. See Dent, supra note 75, at 1266–68. 
 81. Roni Michaely & Christopher Vincent, Do Institutional Investors Influence Capital 
Structure Decisions? 40 (Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 54-2011, 2012), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1941902. 
 82. See supra note 6. 
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than previously thought and may not be much more fragmented than in 
other industrialized countries.
83
 
A related objection to shareholder power is that the interests of 
different shareholders vary; some allegedly do not want to maximize 
share value. These investors can wreak havoc by engaging in “empty 
voting”—in other words, by acquiring and exercising voting power in 
excess of their economic share ownership.
84
 If shareholders had control, 
it is charged, public companies would be torn asunder by warring 
factions of investors.
85
 Accordingly, investors actually like to be 
impotent: “shareholders will prefer to irrevocably delegate 
decisionmaking authority to some smaller group, as, in the long run, this 
will maximize shareholder wealth.”86 
This preference is supposedly evidenced by the frequency of 
antitakeover devices (ATDs) in the charters of companies going public 
through an initial public offering (IPO). If these devices impaired stock 
value by an amount greater than their value to the insiders, it is argued, 
efficiency dictates that they would not be there, so they must be 
efficient.
87
 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1377 (2009). 
 84. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting 
II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 626, 661–81 tbl.1 (2008) (listing more 
than eighty events of decoupling around the world); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge 
Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343, 344 (2007). 
 85. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1287 (2008); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577–93 (2006) (alleging various conflicts of interest 
among shareholders); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751, 1754–57 (2006) (positing danger of special 
interest shareholders); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 661 (2006). 
 86. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 601, 624 (2006); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 
93 VA. L. REV. 789, 803 (2007) (implying that investors do not value strong shareholder rights); 
Lynn Stout, Investors Who Are Too Bolshy for Their Own Good, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at 9 
[hereinafter Stout, Bolshy Investors] (“[T]he modern trend toward greater ‘shareholder power’ 
has gone too far and is beginning to harm the very shareholder it was designed to protect.”). 
 87. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 85, at 1737; Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 347, 358 (1991) (positing that “entrepreneurs selling stock to the public would bear 
the cost” of suboptimal corporate governance provisions); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, 
Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 473, 502 (2003) (“[W]e continue to believe that the IPO charter terms provide 
substantial evidence of appropriate governance structures.”); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover 
Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 845, 853–56 (2002) (“[S]hareholders act as if they value corporate governance rules that 
insulate boards from hostile takeovers.”). 
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Both these arguments have been questioned. Empty voting has not 
yet been a problem; those sounding the alarm have not shown a single 
instance where it altered the outcome of a shareholder vote. And empty 
voting is unlikely to become a problem. For outside investors, it 
depends on stock lending, which “is, to an important degree, self-
policing.”88 One situation in which disparate voting and economic 
interests may cause serious problems is dual class stock (where a 
corporation has multiple classes of voting stock with disparate voting 
rights).
89
 In these situations, however, the holders of superior voting 
rights are always insiders, not institutional investors.
90
 
Except for a few types of shareholders—such as labor unions, 
politically motivated investors, and investors who do business with the 
company—who typically hold just a small fraction of a company’s 
stock, and whose identity and motives are well known to other 
shareholders, nearly all shareholders favor the goal of maximizing share 
price.
91
 This fact is demonstrated by the lack of actual shareholder 
conflicts at shareholder meetings: “shareholders do not have the kinds 
of disputes one would expect if they were a diverse group of Americans 
engaged in a struggle to make corporations in their images.”92 On the 
other hand, investors have not mounted all-out corporate wars to end 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 25 
(2006); see also Reena Aggarwal et al., The Role of Institutional Investors In Voting: Evidence 
from the Securities Lending Market, available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023480 (study 
finding that institutional investors often restrict or call back their loaned shares prior to the 
record date in order to exercise their voting rights, especially for portfolio companies with 
weaker corporate governance, weaker performance, higher institutional ownership, and when 
antitakeover or compensation proposals are on the ballot); Alon Brav & Richmond D. Mathews, 
Empty Voting and the Efficiency of Corporate Governance, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 289 (2011) (using 
an economic model to show that empty voting can be beneficial but may warrant additional 
disclosure requirements); Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of 
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 67 (2011); George W. Dent, Jr., The 
Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
97, 111–15 (2010) [hereinafter Dent, Essential Unity]; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, 
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1076 
(2007) (questioning whether empty voting is a significant problem). 
 89. See Ronald W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 
1697, 1715 (2009) (“[A]s insider voting rights rise relative to cash flow rights, dual-class firms 
tend to make less profitable capital investments, consistent with the firms making investment 
decisions in pursuit of private benefits rather than shareholder wealth maximization.”). 
 90. See DALE A. OESTERLE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 263 (2d ed. 
2006) (stating that higher-voting stock is “sold exclusively to insiders”); id. at 266 (stating that 
in “time-phased” voting plans, “[i]nsiders hold and outsiders trade,” with the result that insiders 
wind up holding more of the higher-voting stock). 
 91. See Dent, Essential Unity, supra note 88, at 105–22. 
 92. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (1996). See also Dent, Essential Unity, supra 
note 88, at 119–22. 
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CEO domination and seize power for themselves.
93
 Even if they do not 
crave CEO domination, perhaps they are indifferent about it. 
Some believe that investors’ failure to wage war stems not from their 
satisfaction with CEO dominance but from unfavorable default rules,
94
 
the high cost of corporate warfare, and the shareholders’ collective 
action problem.
95
 Among other things, management can pay for its 
proxy campaign from the corporate treasury (that is, with the 
shareholders’ own money), while shareholders must finance their fight 
through voluntary contributions. Although all stockholders share pro 
rata in any benefits realized by a proxy fight, no shareholder can be 
compelled to help finance the effort. This ability of shareholders to 
“free ride” makes a broad-based proxy fight impossible in practice. As a 
result, proxy fights are extremely rare.
96
  
Market behavior confirms this skepticism that investors are content 
with CEO dominance. Companies with strong shareholder rights out-
perform others.
97
 In the recent financial meltdown, boards of directors 
in general “played an abysmal role.”98 However, firms with boards with 
“true independence”—that is, with a majority of directors with no 
compromising connections with the CEO—performed better than others 
during the crisis.
99
 The experience suggests that boards should be more 
accountable to shareholders, not less. 
The persistence of poison pills and other ATDs in IPOs is indeed a 
problem for advocates of shareholder primacy, but not a huge one. The 
                                                                                                                     
 93.  “CEO domination” is a more accurate characterization of most public companies 
today than “director primacy.” See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 94. For example, in Delaware, amendment of the corporate charter requires first a 
resolution of the board, then a shareholder vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1). Thus, it 
is impossible for investors to amend the charter in the face of an entrenched board, no matter 
how large the majority in favor of change. 
 95. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 
65 BUS. LAW. 329, 338–49 (2010) (describing some of the impediments to shareholder action). 
 96. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the 
Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 559 (2005). 
 97. See Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, Corporate Governance Norms and Practices 
33 (IMF, CEPR & ECGI Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103608 
(finding that firm-level pro-shareholder governance features are associated with higher market 
valuation of the firm); Dent, Essential Unity, supra note 88, at 120–21; cf. Reena Aggarwal et 
al., The Impact of Corporate Governance Mandates on Poorly Governed Firms 29 (Georgetown 
University McDonough School of Business Working Paper, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023879 (finding that companies required to adopt greater board 
independence by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 experienced a relative increase in firm value 
and in the likelihood of CEO turnover and relatively better earnings quality). 
 98. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 
J. CORP. L. 265, 352 (2012). 
 99. See Bill Francis et al., Do Corporate Boards Affect Firm Performance? New Evidence 
From the Financial Crisis 35 (Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 11, 2012), 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2041194. 
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cost of ATDs is borne by all the pre-IPO shareholders but benefits only 
those who have control.
100
 There are often tax benefits to executives 
from underpricing an IPO,
101
 so the executives may prefer to have 
ATDs that benefit them, even at the cost of a lower price for the stock in 
the IPO. 
Further, most IPOs sell much less than half a company’s stock to the 
public, so most new public firms do not have enough publicly traded 
stock to make a hostile takeover even a mathematical possibility. The 
detriment of the poison pill to stock value, then, must be discounted for 
the probability that the company will not be a takeover target for many 
years and likely will never be a target.  
If ATDs are properly priced and the control group accepts their cost, 
then investors should have no cause to complain about them, but it’s not 
at all clear that this is the case. Underwriters and others who participate 
in pricing IPOs can only guess at the effect of myriad factors on the 
stock’s market value, of which ATDs are just minor ones.102 Many 
purchasers in IPOs are individuals who are not very sophisticated; the 
selling team may calculate (rightly or wrongly) that these customers do 
not properly value strong corporate governance.
103
 In sum, there are too 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 713, 716 (2003) (noting that those who “will continue to run the firm after the 
IPO . . . will fully capture the benefits of [ATDs] and will bear only part of the cost of the 
reduced IPO share price”). There may also be personal benefits to the managers (as opposed to 
the outside investors) of venture capital firms that are usually major shareholders of IPO firms. 
See Dent, Academics in Wonderland, supra note 75, at 1257. 
 101. In about one-third of IPOs from 1996 to 2000, executives received stock options at an 
exercise price equal to the IPO offering price. See Michelle Lowry & Kevin J. Murphy, 
Executive Stock Options and IPO Underpricing, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 40 (2007). In one study, 
over half of these executives realized a net profit from underpricing of the IPO. Id. at 43–45 & 
tbl.1. Further, by retaining control, insiders can extract perquisites (like luxurious offices and 
expense accounts) that are not taxed at all. Cf. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO 
Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 85 
(2001) (positing that ATDs may be used in IPOs to protect incumbents’ large private benefits). 
In effect, the U.S. Treasury bears some of the inefficiency costs of ATDs. IPOs may also be 
deliberately underpriced for various reasons. See, e.g., Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard 
Hoberg, Litigation Risk, Strategic Disclosure and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 
103 J. FIN. ECON. 235, 252 (2012) (concluding that IPOs are often underpriced as a hedge 
against lawsuits). 
 102. See Daines & Klausner, supra note 101, at 113 (“Perhaps governance terms are 
expensive for investors to price at the time of the IPO. This would allow management to get 
protection at low (or no) cost.”). The cost of ATDs varies from firm to firm, and it would be 
costly for analysts and investors to calculate that cost in each individual case. See Michael D. 
Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO 
Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 776–77 (2003). 
 103. IPOs are heavily marketed to unsophisticated “sentiment” or “noise” investors. See 
François Derrien, IPO Pricing in ‘Hot’ Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the Table?, 
60 J. FIN. 487, 497 (2005); Alexander P. Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and 
IPO Pricing 31, 34–36 & fig.1 (AFA San Diego Meetings, 2003), available at 
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many uncertainties in the IPO process to consider the persistence of 
ATDs conclusive proof of their efficiency. 
Moreover, the use of most ATDs is discretionary with the board of 
directors, and the board is supposed to act in the interests of the 
shareholders in handling takeover bids.
104
 Clearly ATDs can be used to 
benefit shareholders, as when a board uses a poison pill to hold a bidder 
at bay while the board seeks a higher bid. Problems arise only when a 
board employs ATDs to benefit the managers, not the shareholders. If 
American boards were responsive to shareholders, as they are in 
Sweden, ATDs would not be a problem. 
The experience of Sweden provides strong evidence that all the 
concerns about shareholder primacy are unfounded. Shareholder control 
has not led to warfare among different investors.
105
 The current Swedish 
situation has evolved slowly, so it is impossible to perform an event 
study of how the change affected Swedish stock prices. Moreover, the 
former situation in Sweden was typically domination by one or two 
shareholders, so it is unclear whether adoption of the new system 
affected stock prices there as much as it would if that system were 
instituted here. However, it is significant that none of the players in 
Sweden are complaining about shareholder primacy because of inter-
shareholder conflicts—or for any other reason. Neither are British 
investors complaining about their greater power generally or, 
specifically, about the absence of antitakeover devices in Britain.  
It is true that American investors are “wholly unused to playing 
nomination roles” because they have been rigorously excluded from a 
major role in corporate governance, but the transfer of such power did 
not cause problems in Sweden.
106
 Moreover, some American investors 
are already preparing for such a role. “CalPERS is leading a quiet 
project designed to create a pool of pre-selected investor-oriented 
directors. Funds could tap them when using access rights.”107 
B.  Investor “Short-Termism” 
Another objection to shareholder primacy in America is that many 
American investors are alleged to be short-sighted.
108
 Like the claim of 
                                                                                                                     
http://ssrn.com/abstract=282293. It is not surprising, then, that “IPOs have provided public 
market investors with low returns throughout the last three decades.” Xiaohui Gao et al., Where 
Have All the IPOs Gone? 1 (Working Paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=19547 
88. 
 104. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 105. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
 107. Davis & Lukomnik, supra note 79, at 2. 
 108. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF 
OUR BUSINESS MYOPIA (1991). 
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fundamental shareholder conflicts, this charge has always seemed 
dubious on its face. Rational investors should favor long-term projects 
that will maximize long-term shareholder wealth. 
Corporate finance theory confirms this intuition. The Efficient 
Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) holds that capital markets 
efficiently price securities at the present value of all expected future 
returns.
109
 The short-termism theory posits that wise long-termist 
managers are pressured by short-termist shareholders (like hedge funds) 
into adopting policies that will damage the company in the long run 
(like cutting research and development). If this were so, the very news 
of hedge fund activism would alert shareholders to the looming blunder. 
Even if investors did not realize this on their own, the company’s far-
sighted managers would protest, and the awakened shareholders would 
rally behind them. In fact, this does not happen, and other investors do 
not flee companies targeted by hedge fund activists; rather, they hang 
on or jump in.
110
 
Further, according to the ECMH, if a company makes unwise 
changes of any kind, the market should recognize the wrong turn and 
send the company’s stock price down. Yet, all the evidence of hedge 
fund activism is to the contrary: “Hedge fund intervention does not as a 
systemic matter impact negatively on” research and development.111 
“[T]argets of intense hedge fund activism . . . show strong 
improvements in operating performance,”112 “including both 
productivity and profitability gains at the plants of the targeted 
companies.”113 “[H]edge fund activists facilitate improvements in terms 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 
347–70 (7th ed. 2003) (describing and documenting the hypothesis). 
 110. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1773 (2008) [hereinafter Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism]; 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 88, at 1091–92 (stating that traditional institutional investors are 
happy to “tag[ ] along” with activist hedge funds). The acceptance of hedge fund activism by 
other investors also indicates that they expect all shareholders to benefit from it, not just the 
hedge fund. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of 
Blockholder Disclosure 13–14 (Harvard Law & Economics Discussion Paper No. 702, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884226; Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and 
the New Hedge Fund Activism, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 701–02 (2007). Correlatively, hedge funds 
profit from an increase in the portfolio company’s stock price, in which all stockholders share, 
and not from private benefits. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 88, at 67. 
 111. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets: Long-Term Results 15 
(Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-17, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677517. 
 112. Nicole M. Boyson & Robert Mooradian, Intense Hedge Fund Activists 1 
(Northeastern University Working Draft, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571728. 
In a broad attack on short-termism by many players in the corporate and financial worlds, 
including many investors, Professor Lynne Dallas recognizes that activist hedge funds are not 
the villains. Dallas, supra note 98, at 306–09. 
 113. Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and 
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of both production efficiency and capital re-allocation.”114 Stock prices 
of companies targeted by hedge funds tend not only to rise but also to 
retain their gains.
115
 The latter phenomenon is hardly surprising since 
any tendency for the share prices of targeted companies first to rise and 
later to fall would violate the ECMH.
116
 
Allegations of short-termism are further belied by the published 
positions of Institutional Shareholder Services, the leading proxy 
advisory firm. Its declared approach to evaluating pay-for-performance 
features evaluations over three- and five-year periods.
117
 As one 
commentator has said of the charge of short-termism, “there is not a lot 
of empirical data to back it up.”118 Another has stated, “no one has 
demonstrated that the long/short phenomenon exists.”119 
                                                                                                                     
Product Market Competition 26 (NBER Working Paper No. w17517, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944424. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. 
ECON. 362, 370 & fig.1 (2009) (empirical study finding that companies subjected to hedge fund 
activism earn positive abnormal returns); Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 110, at 
1729 (“The abnormal return around the announcement of [hedge fund] activism is 
approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year.”); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund 
Activism: A Review, 4 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN FIN. 185, 208–30 (2009); April Klein & Emanuel 
Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. 
FIN. 187, 187 (2009) (empirical study finding “a significantly positive market reaction for the 
target firm around the initial Schedule 13D filing date [by activist hedge funds, and] 
significantly positive returns over the subsequent year”). 
116. If such a pattern could be perceived, astute investors would sell the company’s stock 
and sell it short before it dropped. But if shrewd shareholders did that, the stock price would 
never rise to begin with. And if the stock price never rose to begin with, hedge funds could not 
profit by this ploy. It is telling that no advocate of the short-termist hypothesis has advocated 
investing on the basis of its corollary market postulates. 
 117. See GARY HEWITT & CAROL BOWIE, INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS., EVALUATING PAY FOR 
PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT: ISS’ QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE APPROACH 3 (Feb. 17, 2012), 
available at http://www.issgovernance.com/sites/default/files/EvaluatingPayForPerformance_ 
20111219.pdf. The statement says further: “Business cycles and compensations plans’ 
performance cycles span multiple years. An assessment of alignment between shareholders and 
executives should accordingly see pay across timeframes that approach the length of 
performance and business cycles.” Id. at 6. 
 118. Joe Nocera, A Defense of Short-Termism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at C1. “Baruch 
Lev, the well-known accounting professor at New York University . . . scoffs at the notion that 
short-termism is even a problem.” Id. 
 119. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
10, 13 (1991); see also Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 
391, 415 (2009) (“While popular, I do not know of any empirical support for this view.”). See 
also Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Stephen Davis, Are Institutional Investors Part of the Problem or 
Part of the Solution? 24 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Millstein Ctr. for Corp Governance and 
Performance), available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/sites/millstein.som.yale.edu/files/80235 
_CED_WEB.pdf (“defining the actual problem [of short-termism] with specificity is both 
empirically and conceptually difficult”). Of course, many investors tend to hold stocks only for 
a short period of time. However, that does not mean that they advocate policies that would 
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Legitimate questions have been raised about how well stock market 
prices reflect fundamental (or intrinsic) value.
120
 However, most of 
these questions concern broader market behavior, such as the 
persistence of the housing market bubble, not the mispricing of 
individual stocks within an industry. Moreover, for the short-termist 
hypothesis to be valid, markets cannot just be occasionally, slightly, and 
randomly inaccurate; they must be frequently and substantially 
inaccurate in the same, predictable way. Thus the short-term scam 
artists must fool the stock market repeatedly, despite warnings of 
managers, who are routinely vindicated but continue to be ignored by 
investors. If this actually happened, it would raise questions not only 
about shareholder primacy but about the very idea of markets and a 
market economy. 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are sometimes claimed to demonstrate 
the existence of short-termism. LBOs occur, it is argued, because 
shareholders of a public company coerce its managers to pursue a short-
term strategy; an LBO puts the company into private hands, freeing it 
from these malevolent pressures.
121
 Certainly managers of firms 
undergoing LBOs often give this explanation for the transaction. 
One problem with this explanation is that many investors in the 
private equity funds that perform LBOs are the same investors that are 
supposedly the short-termist demons tormenting public companies. 
Why they would be short-termists in one context and patient capitalists 
in another is not explained. More important, LBOs invite a very 
different explanation: public companies incur agency costs. That is, 
managers follow the typical human tendency to benefit themselves 
rather than others—namely, the shareholders for whom they are 
fiduciaries—whereas, shareholders are unable to curb the managers’ 
self-serving behaviors.
122
 Thus, a powerful CEO has become more or 
less synonymous with the concept of waste.
123
 An LBO replaces 
                                                                                                                     
impair long-term value. 
 120. See Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning 
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1439–40 (2005) (alleging that the relationship 
between the two is “extremely loose”) [hereinafter Takeovers in the Ivory Tower]; Lynn A. 
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. 
L. 635, 636 (2003). 
 121. See Dale A. Oesterle, Are Leveraged Buyouts a Form of Governance Arbitrage?, 3 
BROOK. J. CORP. & COM. L. 53, 67 (2008); Stout, Bolshy Investors, supra note 86 (stating that 
private companies can “avoid dealing with public shareholders’ loud and often conflicting 
demands”). 
 122. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation 6 (Harvard Business 
Review, 1989), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149 (last updated 1997). 
 123. See Clara Xiaoling Chen et al., The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and the 
Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs, 29 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 
252 (2012). 
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numerous, scattered public shareholders with a sophisticated LBO firm 
that can monitor the managers and design compensation packages that 
induce them to abandon the wasteful practices that were indulged when 
the company was public and instead to render their optimal 
performance. 
This curbing-agency-costs explanation seems more plausible than 
the eliminating-short-termist-public-shareholders rationale.
124
 After 
LBOs, firms often cut unnecessary expenses, sell off unsuitable assets, 
and lay off unprofitable employees—steps consistent with the former 
explanation—rather than expanding research and development and 
inaugurating new projects, which would be predicted by the latter 
rationale.
125
 After LBOs, firms’ executive compensation is also 
“redesign[ed] . . . away from earnings-based and non-financial” bonus 
criteria to stock options conditioned on performance.
126
 Of course, firm 
managers prefer to ascribe the LBO to impetuous investors, rather than 
to their own behavior, but these claims are not credible. 
Although the interest of shareholders is to maximize the value of the 
equity, the managers do not always share that interest. Sometimes 
managers may profit from short-term measures. They may doctor a 
company’s financials and other public disclosures in order to mislead 
the market and inflate the company’s stock price and then unload their 
stock at the inflated price before they reveal the truth, causing the stock 
price to fall back to its proper level.
127
 Outside investors do not control 
                                                                                                                     
 124. See Dent, Essential Unity, supra note 88, at 128–30. 
 125. See John Haltiwanger et al., Private Equity and Employment 4, 33 (NBER Working 
Paper No. w17399, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1931170 (empirical study 
finding that employment declines on average six percent over five years after an LBO, and 
reductions are greater in public-to-private buyouts). 
 126. Henrik Cronqvist & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Abstract, CEO Contract Design: How Do 
Strong Principals Do It? (Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 11-14, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786132; Robert J. Jackson, Private Equity and Executive 
Compensation, 60 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (finding that “the total amount of CEO 
pay is similar in [public and private-equity owned] firms, but that private equity owners tie CEO 
pay much more closely to performance”). 
 127. See ROBERT H. TILLMAN & MICHAEL L. INDERGAARD, PUMP AND DUMP: THE RANCID 
RULES OF THE NEW ECONOMY 4–5 (2005); David C. Cicero, The Manipulation of Executive 
Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating, 64 J. FIN. 2627, 2627–28 
(2009) (examining stock price patterns that suggest executives use private information to 
increase the profitability of stock option exercises); Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate 
Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other 
Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 667 (2007) (“[T]he likelihood of a misstated financial statement 
increases greatly when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options.”); 
Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 456 (2008) (“[M]anagers . . . often 
inflate the short-term stock price before selling to boost their trading profits.”). A recent study 
finds that investment myopia is associated with an aging CEO, but that this tendency is 
countered by large shareholdings of institutional investors. Jaideep Chowdhury, Managerial 
Myopia: A New Look 37 (James Madison University Research Paper, 2011), available at 
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the company’s disclosures and therefore cannot engage in such 
schemes. Accordingly, it should not be surprising that managers were 
more responsible than investors for the imprudent choices that led to the 
recent financial crisis.
128
 One recent study of firms’ sensitivity to 
growth opportunities finds “significant distortions as a result of 
managerial myopia.”129 However, “[c]onsistent with an agency 
explanation, this investment distortion disappears when we conduct 
similar tests using only firms with strong corporate governance.”130 In 
other words, shareholder power is not the cause of, but rather a counter 
to, short-termism. On the other hand, managers may engage in empire 
building—that is, they may undertake projects that do not promise at 
least a market rate of return because those projects will expand the 
company and justify greater compensation and perquisites. 
Of course, managers may honestly disagree with the proposals of 
activist shareholders. Given the difficulty of predictions in business, it is 
certain that the activists are not always right and the managers always 
wrong. However, the market evidence indicates that the investors are 
usually right. Shareholder primacy should lead to less short-termism, 
not more, as well as less empire building. 
Moreover, we have the benefit of the Swedish experience. There is 
some evidence that Swedish shareholders tend to hold their stock for 
longer periods than American investors do. However, there is no 
requirement that shareholder representatives on Swedish nominating 
committees have held their stock for any minimum period of time 
before gaining representation on the nominating committee or that they 
commit to retain their stock for any minimum period.
131
 There is no 
evidence that shareholder primacy has caused Swedish companies to 
abandon long-term projects, or to go private in order to escape the 
tyranny of short-termist investors.
132
 Nor is there any such evidence in 
Britain or other nations that give shareholders more power than the 
                                                                                                                     
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1991429. In other words, it is the institutional investors that take a 
long-term view, while at least older CEOs are the short-termists. 
 128. See Dallas, supra note 98, at 352; see also supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 129. Jaideep Chowdhury & Jason D. Fink, Managerial Myopia: Tests and Implications 2 
(James Madison University Research Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2055353. 
 130. Id. at Abstract. 
 131. In one reported incident, an investor purchased a company’s stock just to get 
representation on the nomination committee. See Engvall & Holmberg, supra note 3, at 2. 
However, this ploy “met strong resistance” from other shareholders. Id. It is not clear what an 
investor could hope to accomplish that would injure other shareholders, and I do not know of 
any incidents where any damage has been caused to the companies in question. Some have 
suggested that full voting rights be limited to shareholders who have owned their stock for a 
substantial period of time. See Dallas, supra note 98, at 351–53. The Swedish experience 
suggests that this is unnecessary, at least for purposes of representation of a shareholder 
nominating committee. 
 132. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
2012] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE SWEDISH SOLUTION 1655 
 
United States does. 
No one has suggested why American investors would be less rational 
than investors in these nations. Indeed, American institutions have 
major investments in Sweden,
133
 and they have not clashed with other 
shareholders there. Are we to believe that these investors are short-
termists in America but not in Sweden? 
But even if the short-termism of some investors is cause for concern, 
it seems that the Swedish system would combat rather than exacerbate 
the problem. A large shareholder gets only to appoint one member of 
the nominating committee, which nominates a slate of directors at the 
next annual meeting. Thus, the shareholder must wait at least a year 
before having any influence on the composition of the board. A longer 
wait—probably much longer—would be necessary before the board 
could alter corporate operations. Indeed, because the Swedish system 
makes the board responsive to the shareholders and not to the CEO, it 
ultimately makes it harder for a short-termist activist to complain that an 
incumbent board is flouting shareholder interests. In sum, the evidence 
from Sweden and elsewhere is that shareholder control does not cause 
any problems of short-termism. 
C.  Shareholder Ignorance 
Other commentators have argued against shareholder primacy 
because investors lack the knowledge requisite to run corporations.
134
 
They concede that in theory there is a difference between managing and 
choosing the (best) people to manage, but they insist that in reality the 
latter necessarily entails the former.
135
 
Like the other critiques of shareholder power, this one seems 
unconvincing. A patient can seek and choose the best brain surgeon 
without interfering with his operation. In any number of fields 
individuals and organizations choose agents, monitor their performance, 
and replace agents who are perceived to be inadequate. The process of 
                                                                                                                     
 133. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal 13 
(UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121 (“Shareholders have neither the information nor the incentives 
necessary to make sound decisions on either operational or policy questions.”); Stout, Takeovers 
in the Ivory Tower, supra note 120, at 1443 (alleging that investors are “often driven by emotion 
and cognitive bias”); Bernard S. Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful to Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 387, 402 (2012) (“[S]hareholders are at an informational 
disadvantage in nominating directors relative to directors.”).  
135. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy 13 (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ. 
Research Paper No. 10-06, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615838 (“[G]iving 
investors this power of review differs little from giving them the power to make management 
decisions in the first place.”); see also Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing 
Fiduciary Duty at the Officer Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2009). 
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monitoring may well intrude on the agent’s performance, and a 
principal may choose not to exercise a right to interfere with the agent’s 
performance, but monitoring need not and typically does not 
substantially impair the benefits of the agent’s expertise. 
Expertise and informational advantage are not the sole or even the 
most important, concerns; one must also consider the parties’ 
incentives. Agents and fiduciaries have an incentive to favor their own 
interests over those of the beneficiaries. That is why we subject 
agents—no matter how expert they are—to the authority of the principal 
and fiduciaries to fiduciary duties. That is why we do not let CEOs set 
their own compensation or make corporate boards formally self-
perpetuating.  
Some evidence in America contradicts the shareholder-ignorance 
thesis. The quality of equity compensation proposals improved after the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began requiring 
shareholder approval of all equity-based executive compensation plans, 
policies, and practices for large public companies in 2003,
136
 and this 
shareholder “say on pay” has worked well.137 Similarly, adoption of a 
majority (rather than plurality) voting requirement for election to a 
board of directors is also associated with enhanced equity values.
138
 
Among other things, shareholders have worked to eliminate staggered 
boards—widely accepted as harmful to the success of a company139—
and the presence of a large block-holder on a board of directors has 
resulted in higher (not lower) capital expenditures.
140
 Evidently, 
shareholders know what they are doing. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 136. See Lilian Ng et al., Does Shareholder Approval Requirement of Equity Compensation 
Plans Matter?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1510, 1527 (2011). 
 137. See GREG RUEL, GMI RATINGS, GMI’S SAY ON PAY REVIEW: POTENTIAL SAY ON PAY 
FAILURES FOR 2012 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www3.gmiratings.com/wp-
content/themes/gmi/images/pdf/1772gmi_sayonpayreview_112011.pdf; Steven Balsam & 
Jennifer Yin, The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive Compensation 22–23 (Research Draft, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026121 (empirical study finding, among other 
things, that “affected firms shifted their compensation mix to more performance-based 
compensation” and that “shareholder voting on say-on-pay is not random, but systematically 
related to compensation practices”). It is embarrassing that there is even a debate about “say on 
pay” given that Sweden requires a ninety percent vote for approval of executive equity 
compensation. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 138. Yonca Ertimur, et al., Does the Director Election System Matter? Evidence from 
Majority Voting 27–28 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880974. 
 139. See, News Alert,  THE HARV. L. SCH. S’HOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://srp.law.harvard.edu/newsletters/03-19-2012_SRP-News-Alert.html (announcing efforts 
by several institutional investors). 
 140. See Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Corporate Financial and Investment Policies in 
the Presence of a Blockholder on the Board 24 (5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal 
Studies Paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783891. 
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Moreover, with respect to corporate governance the Swedish 
experience refutes Professor Stephen Bainbridge’s position that 
shareholders lack the information and incentives to participate usefully 
in corporate governance.
141
 Nomination committees are not supposed to 
interfere with actual management, and they do not.
142
 There is no reason 
why shareholder primacy would operate any differently here. 
D.  Self-Dealing by Powerful Shareholders 
Another possible concern about shareholder primacy is the 
possibility of self-dealing by newly empowered shareholders. However, 
most large investors (like mutual and pension funds) do not engage in 
activities that would lend themselves to self-dealing, not to mention the 
several hurdles that would have to be overcome to achieve these unfair 
profits. First, self-dealing is a breach of fiduciary duty (unless the 
controlling shareholder sustains the burden of proving that the 
transaction was entirely fair to the company).
143
 Second, under no 
scenario for effecting shareholder primacy would a single minority 
shareholder dominate the committee that nominates directors, much less 
the board itself.
144
 Any attempt at self-dealing should be apparent to 
other members of the nomination committee and to the directors, who 
would have to approve the transaction. It is hard to imagine that a single 
minority shareholder could bully this large cast of sophisticated 
characters into accepting a transaction that would injure the company. 
Moreover, the Swedish experience belies this worry, too. It is telling 
that small shareholders first proposed the Swedish system and that the 
self-dealing potential of representation on the nomination committee is 
so remote that some eligible shareholders have waived representation.
145
 
Self-dealing by shareholders that are represented on the NC has not 
posed any problems.
146
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See Bainbridge, supra note 134. 
 142. There is a clear understanding that a nominating committee “is not taking over the job 
of a board. Strategic decisions are delegated to the board and the shareholders have no say in 
those decisions . . . .” TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 26. 
 143. In reviewing self-dealing transactions, courts use phrases like “entire fairness,” see, 
e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 
1985), “intrinsic fairness,” see, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 
1971), and “closest scrutiny,” see, e.g., Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., 
Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 1988). 
 144. Under my own proposal each of the largest shareholders would have one of ten to 
twenty seats on the nomination committee. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying 
Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 907–11 (1989). 
 145. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, it is not impossible that empowered shareholders might 
occasionally exploit their positions for individual profit. However, no 
human institution is immune from abuse. The proper question is not 
whether shareholder primacy would be perfect, but whether it would be 
better than the alternatives. American public companies already suffer 
often from self-serving conduct by executives.
147
 Directors are supposed 
to prevent such conduct, but managers often subvert the directors’ 
independence.
148
 If shareholders controlled, they would have strong 
incentives to curb such activity. Perhaps shareholder primacy would not 
completely eliminate self-dealing, but almost certainly it would reduce 
it considerably. 
E.  Employees and the Social Welfare System 
Swedish law also treats workers differently than American law does 
in both corporate governance and in employment law. About 65% of 
private sector workers in Sweden are unionized.
149
 Further, “Swedish 
law requires that at least three board members represent the 
employees.”150 However, that is a separate issue from the division of 
power between, on one side, executives and the board and, on the other, 
the shareholders. 
Professor Christopher Bruner argues that the treatment of employees 
in corporate governance must be viewed not in isolation but in light of 
“the deep connection between corporate governance and numerous 
other forms of regulation that condition relationships within the 
corporate enterprise.”151 In particular, in America, employers are 
expected to provide employees with “the very things that government 
                                                                                                                     
 147. See Dent, supra note 75, at 1244–49. 
 148. See id. at 1240–44. 
 149. See Ander Kjellberg, The Decline in Swedish Union Density Since 2007, 1 NORDIC J. 
OF WORKING LIFE STUDS. 67, 70 tbl.2 (2011). 
 150. Johanson & Østergren, supra note 2, at 530. The significance of this requirement 
should not be exaggerated. Employee representatives 
participate in the board work on equal terms with members appointed by the 
general meeting with the same duties, rights and responsibilities. As such, they 
must represent the interest of the company and not (at least not legally) the 
interests of the employees. This system seems to work although (or perhaps 
because) employee representatives are commonly known to be rather quiet in 
the board meetings. 
Evis Sinani et al., Corporate Governance in Scandinavia: Comparing Networks and Formal 
Institutions, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 27, 33 (2008). For a general description of this system of “co-
determination,” see Carlsson, supra note 6, at 1039–41. In any case, co-determination now “is 
clearly on its way out, and European law and practice as a whole are moving quickly toward the 
standard shareholder-oriented model.” Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 62, at 11. 
 151. Bruner, supra note 67, at 650. 
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programs do in other countries, namely, protecting workers against the 
risk of lost income, and providing health and retirement benefits.”152 
Even assuming this characterization to be true, it is still unclear how 
it is relevant to the debate between shareholder primacy and America’s 
current regime, which is to a large extent CEO primacy.
153
 To maximize 
shareholder wealth, employees should be paid only what the market 
demands for that purpose. If employees are treated better under the 
American system of CEO domination, then CEOs must be paying 
employees more than that amount. 
On its face this possibility seems barely plausible. CEOs who can 
divert substantial funds from investors may toss a few pennies to their 
employees—and by so doing, CEOs could profit by gaining the 
admiration of those with whom they work daily. However, one would 
expect CEOs to keep most of the surplus for themselves as well as for 
the directors and other high executives whose support is necessary or 
convenient to the CEO. Thus, Professor Lucian Bebchuk dismisses the 
“employee benefit” justification for CEO domination as a mere cover 
for management entrenchment and “management slack.”154 The 
empirical literature seems to confirm this skepticism. There is little or 
no difference between the compensation of employees of public 
companies, where shareholder primacy is rare, and employees of 
privately-owned companies, in which, almost by definition, 
shareholders exercise ultimate control.
155
 
In arguing against shareholder primacy, Professor Christopher 
Bruner invokes the experience of Walmart, which “endeavored to boost 
returns for shareholders at the expense of other constituencies by 
‘shifting health care costs’ to employees and to taxpayers funding 
limited state health care programs,” but ultimately abandoned this 
attempt because of broad public opposition.
156
 The choice of this 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 638 (citing David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1601, 1606 (1996)). 
 153. See Dent, Academics in Wonderland supra note 75, at 1240–44; Z. Jill Barclift, 
Corporate Governance and CEO Dominance, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 611, 611 (2011). Others use 
the term “board capture” for domination of boards by CEOs. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & 
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 61–79 (2004). 
 154. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 837, 908–13 (2005). 
 155. See Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on 
Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm Behavior, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 165, 166–67, 184–93 
(1990) (finding higher productivity after an LBO and that this was not a result of reduced 
research and development, wages, capital investment, or layoffs of blue collar workers); Paige 
Parker Ouimet & Rebecca Zarutskie, Acquiring Labor 40–41 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571891 (finding that many acquisitions are motivated by a desire to 
acquire the target’s employees and that in these cases wages rise substantially after an 
acquisition). 
 156. Bruner, supra note 67, at 642. 
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precedent is ironic because Walmart, although publicly traded, is still 
effectively controlled by the corporation’s founding family. In other 
words, the incident proves the opposite of what Professor Bruner 
intended—it illustrates the irrelevance of corporate governance structure 
to the vulnerability of well-known retail companies to public opinion. 
To support his thesis, Professor Bruner offers another example—
opposition to leveraged hostile tender offers because of their supposed 
detrimental effect on employees.
157
 He is right that this concern was 
often expressed as a justification for allowing incumbent, CEO-
controlled boards of directors to thwart tender offers that shareholders 
favored, but it is unclear whether the concern was a valid basis for 
public opposition, rather than a convenient ruse fabricated by executives 
seeking to entrench themselves through legislation to be adopted by 
compliant lawmakers. If the effects of takeovers on employees had been 
a serious public concern, there would have been no reason to distinguish 
between hostile and friendly takeovers, and thus the power to thwart 
takeovers should have been conferred on the employees themselves 
rather than their bosses. Of course, such legislation was never even 
suggested, much less adopted. 
If the concern had been about leveraged acquisitions—which might 
raise some valid concerns for workers
158—legislatures could have 
singled out mergers financed with debt. They did not. Moreover, if 
Professor Bruner’s distinction between CEO domination and 
shareholder primacy were central, antitakeover legislation should have 
distinguished between acquisitions by public companies, which 
generally feature the former, and acquisitions by private companies, 
which are generally shareholder-controlled. Again, no such law was 
even proposed. Antitakeover laws seem to serve primarily to benefit 
incumbent managers. Although labor representatives may have gone 
along with these laws, they made no great effort to mold them to benefit 
employees and seem to have considered these laws a minor issue. 
Although Professor Bruner posits that shareholder primacy is more 
threatening to American workers than to others because American 
government provides relatively few social welfare benefits, it is still 
interesting that Swedish workers have registered no objections to the 
shift to shareholder primacy, especially given that the Corporate 
Governance Code states that the purpose of corporate governance there 
is to run companies “as efficiently as possible on behalf of their 
shareholders.”159 If shareholder primacy and the growing prominence of 
British and American investors threatened employees, certainly the 
                                                                                                                     
 157. Id. at 639. 
 158. LBOs may be followed by employee layoffs. See Haltiwanger et al., supra note 125, 
at 30. 
 159. THE SWEDISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 10, at 3. 
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powerful Swedish unions would have protested. Once again, they have 
not, and their acquiescence testifies eloquently that workers have 
nothing to fear from shareholder control. 
F.  Corporate Governance and Other Constituencies 
A related argument against shareholder power is that not only 
employees but other constituencies, like customers and communities in 
which a firm does business, may make various kinds of investments in 
the firm, investments that might be devalued by a change of the firm’s 
strategy. In that case, “shareholders might reassure stakeholder 
investors and encourage their specific investment by ceding control to a 
board that cannot personally profit (as shareholders can) from business 
strategies that enhance shareholder wealth by destroying the value of 
other stakeholders’ specific investments.”160 Similarly, a board that is 
not accountable to shareholders (or anyone else) may be more socially 
responsible; it may “sacrifice profits in the public interest.”161 
Professor Lynn Stout argues that directors are more sensitive than 
“anonymous shareholders” to “shaming or other ‘social sanctions’ that 
follow corporate misbehavior.”162 This argument, once again, is 
unconvincing at best. America has had many corporate scandals in 
which managers and directors of public companies enriched themselves; 
they do not seem to have been deterred by the prospect of “shaming.” 
Further, if Professor Stout were right, we would expect to see more 
corporate misbehavior and more abuse of outside constituencies by 
companies that have gone from public to private in LBOs because 
boards then lose their independence and become subject to the private 
equity firm as dominant shareholder. I am not aware of any evidence of 
such a phenomenon. Moreover, outside constituencies and public 
interest groups have not objected to LBOs, which suggests that they do 
not share Professor Stout’s view. 
Finally, the Swedish experience offers no evidence to support her 
argument. There have been no charges of antisocial behavior by 
shareholder-dominated companies and no movement to eliminate the 
new system in order to improve corporate social responsibility. 
G.  If Shareholder Primacy is Beneficial, Why Haven’t Shareholders 
Adopted It? 
If the foregoing arguments for shareholder primacy are valid, then 
why has it not been instituted? Professor Stephen Bainbridge argues that 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy” 17 (UCLA School of 
Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 11-04, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1763944. 
 161. Id. at 20. 
 162. Id. 
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shareholders favor their own powerlessness.
163
 This argument is also 
weak. Shareholders have not chosen powerlessness but have had it 
imposed upon them because the rules disfavor them. In particular, in a 
proxy fight shareholders face a collective action problem because they 
are numerous and must bear their own solicitation costs.
164
 By contrast, 
management is centralized and can pay its costs out of the corporate 
treasury—that is, their battle against shareholders is financed with the 
shareholders’ own money. 
Nonetheless, contrary to Professor Bainbridge’s claim, shareholders 
have struggled for a stronger voice in corporate governance, and they 
have achieved considerable success.
165
 Changing conditions have 
helped, including the rise of activist hedge funds and of proxy advisory 
services that have reduced the cost of intelligent proxy voting for 
institutional investors.
166
 Traditionally, American institutional investors 
were passive and followed the “Wall Street Rule”—vote with 
management or sell.
167
 That attitude has been changing for several 
years, and institutional investors are increasingly assertive.
168
 However, 
it is unclear whether anything shareholders can do would install the 
Swedish system in the United States. The next section will discuss two 
ways this might be accomplished. 
III.  TWO WAYS FORWARD 
Instituting shareholder control of American public companies would 
give the nation a significant economic boost. But how is it to be 
achieved? Delaware is the domicile now chosen by most American 
public companies, largely because it favors managers over 
shareholders.
169
 Delaware will not voluntarily surrender the substantial 
franchise fees it receives by abandoning that bias. Another state could 
challenge Delaware by adopting a corporate code that instituted 
                                                                                                                     
 163. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. The argument is bolstered by investors’ 
acceptance of antitakeover devices in companies going public. See supra note 87 and 
accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Dent, Academics in Wonderland, supra note 75, at 1264–69. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE x (4th ed. 2008); 
see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Dent, Academics in Wonderland, supra note 75, at 1264–69. 
 169. See George W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L. 499, 
505–07 (2010); see also supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. A recent study finds that 
“Delaware firms pay their CEOs significantly more generously than do non-Delaware firms” 
and that “Delaware firms exhibit significantly lower pay-performance sensitivity . . .  implying 
that the higher pay more likely reflects rent expropriation rather than shareholder wealth 
maximization.” Pornsit Jiraporn et al., Does Delaware Incorporation Affect Executive 
Compensation? An Empirical Analysis 2 (Texas A&M International University Research Paper, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007983. 
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shareholder control. However, shareholders could move a public 
company from Delaware to that state only if they controlled it; but if 
they already controlled it, they would not need to change its state of 
incorporation. Thus Delaware is largely immune to interstate 
competition. Nonetheless, there are two possible paths to shareholder 
primacy: SEC rulemaking and shareholder-adopted bylaws. 
A.  SEC Rulemaking 
The Dodd–Frank Act gave the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) authority to require inclusion of shareholder nominations for the 
board of directors in an issuer’s proxy statement.170 The SEC could use 
this power to require issuers to include nominations of, say, a committee 
of representatives of the issuer’s ten largest shareholders.171 Corporate 
boards could continue to offer shareholders their own slate of nominees. 
Shareholders would then choose between the two. 
The Commission exercised this statutory authority when it adopted 
Rule 14a-11, which was struck down by the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals because the SEC had not performed an 
adequate cost–benefit analysis of the rule.172 Some critics argued that 
increasing shareholder power would do more harm than good to 
corporate governance.
173
 However, these critiques were based on 
debatable assumptions about corporate governance—assumptions that 
seem to be belied by the Swedish experience. 
The rule also attracted a more subtle objection: even if the rule might 
improve corporate governance, its benefits were outweighed by the 
costs of compliance for issuers. The critics were answered by supporters 
of the rule, and both focused on empirical event studies concerning the 
stock market’s reaction to various incidents in the course of the rule’s 
life.
174
 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (amending The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78n(a)). 
 171. The SEC would have to provide rules for the formation and operation of these 
committees. 
 172. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 173. See Bainbridge, supra note 134, at 17; Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of 
Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 499–500 (2012); Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s 
Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 394 & 
n.163 (2010). 
 174. See David F. Larcker et al., The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance 
Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 446 (2011) (finding a small negative reaction to the adoption 
of SEC Rule 14a-11). However, the market might have been disappointed “in the laxness of the 
regulation.” Id. at 432 n.5; see also Fabrizio Ferri, ‘Low-Cost’ Shareholder Activism: A Review 
of the Evidence 17–18 (Columbia Business School Research Paper, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718495 (noting that “the Council of Institutional Investors, while 
supporting proxy access, strongly opposed the version proposed by the SEC in July 2007 
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Although Rule 14a-11 would have afforded shareholders a new 
opportunity to place nominations for the board on a corporate proxy 
statement, the rule was so restrictive and its procedures so cumbersome 
that investors would probably have made very little use of it.
175
 At the 
same time, Rule 14a-11 would have imposed nontrivial costs on issuers, 
costs that would have been relatively more burdensome to smaller 
public companies.
176
 As a Danish scholar put it, “The real panacea, that 
of dominant shareholders, is not available, forcing legislators [here, 
regulators] to discipline management by the crude and intrusive 
instrument of law-making.”177 Thus, it is not surprising that the market 
might have had a slightly negative reaction to adoption of the rule. 
Nonetheless, that reaction does not show that enhanced shareholder 
involvement in corporate governance is invariably unwise; it merely 
shows that the costs of the SEC’s clumsy rule may have outweighed its 
benefits. The Swedish experience indicates that having directors 
nominated by representatives of the largest shareholders is beneficial, so 
an SEC rule providing for inclusion of a slate of the nominees of a 
committee of a company’s largest shareholders should be well-received 
by the market. Nonetheless, to satisfy potential critics the SEC should 
allow corporations to opt out of the rule by a majority shareholder 
                                                                                                                     
because [it was]  too restrictive”). One empirical study reached “findings . . . consistent with the 
view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the 
SEC’s August 2010 Rule.” Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm 
Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge 4 (NBER Working Paper No. 
w17797, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998597; see also JoAnna Tochman 
Campbell et al., Shareholder Influence Over Director Nomination Via Proxy Access: 
Implications for Agency Conflict and Stakeholder Value, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 166 (2012) 
(finding a positive overall market reaction to announcement of the rule); Torsten Jochem, Does 
Proxy Access Increase Shareholder Wealth? Evidence from a Natural Experiment 1 (University 
of Pittsburgh Research Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022706 (finding that 
the court decision striking down Rule 14a-11 “resulted in a decline of valuations for plausibly 
entrenched firms, smaller firms . . . and firms in which more investors qualified . . . [for] greater 
proxy access”); Jonathan B. Cohn et al., Abstract, On the Optimality of Shareholder Control: 
Evidence from the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act (University of Texas Research Paper, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1742506 (finding that “increased hurdles to proxy 
access are associated with losses in shareholder value for firms owned by institutional investors 
who are likely to use proxy access”). 
 175. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1347 (2011). 
 176. See Thomas Stratmann & J.W. Verret, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Damage Share 
Value in Small Publicly Traded Companies?, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1431–32 (2012). One 
possible cost of the rule is that it could have been used by union pension funds bent on 
promoting their own interests at the expense of the other shareholders. See Bainbridge, supra 
note 85, at 1751 (discussing the potential for unions to exploit shareholder activism at the 
expense of other stockholders).  
 177. Hansen, supra note 1, at 76. 
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vote.
178
 I doubt that investors would do so. To be consistent, the rule 
should also allow shareholders of companies that opt out to be able to 
opt back into the rule by a majority vote. The incumbent board would 
remain free to nominate a competing slate, in which case shareholders 
would choose between them.
179
 
Such a rule would encounter furious opposition from corporate 
executives. Even the minor bow to shareholder power in the ill-fated 
Rule 14a-11 provoked their wrath. A rule that would make them 
accountable to the owners of their firms would encounter even greater 
resistance. Given the executives’ political power and financial influence 
in Washington, they might well succeed. However, there is another path 
that they may not be able to block. 
B.  Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws 
Shareholders may already be able to seize control of public 
companies through their power to amend the bylaws to create a 
committee of the ten largest shareholders to nominate directors and 
provide that the committee’s slate of nominees be included on the 
company’s proxy statement.180 This possibility faces three obstacles. 
The first is that it might not be supported by holders of a majority of the 
outstanding shares. Gaining that support is more difficult because 
abstentions and shares not voted in effect count as negative votes. 
Further, in a proxy fight, conditions favor management. Shareholders 
face a collective action problem because they are scattered and must pay 
their own proxy expenses even though each shareholder will receive 
only a small fraction of any gains resulting from a successful 
campaign.
181
 Management, however, is centralized and pays its costs 
out of the corporate treasury. Second, a majority vote might not suffice. 
A large minority of public companies require a supermajority vote to 
amend their bylaws.
182
 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Some commentators criticized Rule 14a-11 for lacking such an opt-out provision. See 
Grundfest, supra note 173, at 384. Because of the obstacles to shareholder action, it would be 
better to have a provision for shareholder-committee nominations from which shareholders 
could opt out rather than requiring shareholder action to opt into the provision. See Bebchuk & 
Hirst, supra note 95, at 338–42. To be even more cautious, the SEC could begin by applying the 
rule to only a select set of companies. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The 
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issues this situation would raise. 
 180. Shareholders have this power in all states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) 
(2010). 
 181. See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also Dent, supra note 75, at 1253. 
 182. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 95, at 341. An effort to adopt such a bylaw under 
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A third obstacle is that the shareholders’ power to amend the bylaws 
coexists with the rule that a corporation is to be “managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors.”183 Attempting to reconcile these 
two provisions, the Delaware Supreme Court held in CA, Inc. v. 
AFSCME Employees Pension Plan
184
 that a shareholder-adopted bylaw 
may be valid, but that it will not bind the board if it would require the 
board to breach its fiduciary duties.
185
 
Would the contemplated bylaw be valid and binding? Shareholders 
could argue that this situation differs from that in CA, Inc. because the 
bylaw there required the board to take some action—in that case, to 
reimburse proxy insurgents who have achieved a certain level of 
support.
186
 For the board to do that might cause it to breach its fiduciary 
duties if the reimbursement would violate Delaware law.  
By contrast, a bylaw establishing a shareholder nomination 
committee (SNC) could not require the board to take any illegal action. 
Corporate employees would only have to perform some minimal, 
ministerial tasks, such as giving notice of the identity of the ten largest 
shareholders. Further, this bylaw would involve shareholder voting, 
which Delaware courts have called the “ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”187 
However, fiduciary duties require the board not only to refrain from 
illegal acts but also to act affirmatively in the best interests of the 
corporation. A traditional part of this activity is recommending to the 
shareholders the people whom the board judges best qualified to be 
directors. Under current conditions, a board’s failure to do this could 
give rise to chaos over the election of directors at the annual shareholder 
meeting and leave the company vulnerable to miscreants who could 
seize control and mismanage the company.
188
 Such a failure would 
seem to violate the board’s duty to manage. 
The existence of an SNC arguably would not relieve the board of its 
duty to nominate candidates for the board. An SNC could nominate 
candidates the board considered incompetent or dishonest, or simply not 
                                                                                                                     
SEC Rule 14a-8 would also be complicated by the restrictions of that rule. See id. 
 183. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010). The board enjoys this power “except as may 
be otherwise provided . . . in [the] certificate of incorporation.” Id. However, to amend the 
certificate requires first a resolution of the board and then a shareholder vote. Id. § 242(b)(1). 
Thus, the shareholders cannot amend the charter unless they already control the board, and if 
they already control the board they do not need to amend the charter. 
 184. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
 185. See id. at 239–40. 
 186. Id. at 230. 
 187. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 188. Directors are generally elected by a plurality of the shareholder votes. See FRANKLIN 
A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 186–87 & n.28 (2d ed. 2010). Thus, in the absence of an 
official slate, a faction might prevail with just a few votes. 
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the best possible candidates. In that case, the board would have not just 
the right but also a fiduciary duty to offer the shareholders an alternate 
slate. Thus, it seems that a shareholder-adopted bylaw cannot relieve the 
board of its duty nominate candidates for the board. Even more so, it 
cannot deprive the board of its discretion to do so. If the board believed 
that the shareholder committee’s nominees were well-qualified, it could 
of course support that slate. If it felt otherwise, the board could 
nominate another slate and leave it to the shareholders to choose 
between them. 
Shareholders are already free to nominate candidates for the board, 
so establishment of an SNC does not impose shareholders into a realm 
reserved exclusively to the board. The contemplated bylaw would only 
require the board to identify the largest shareholders. The only 
conceivable objection would be that the very existence of such a 
committee constitutes such a threat to the welfare of the corporation that 
the board could not properly authorize even this minor, ministerial task. 
Especially given the significance attached to the shareholder franchise, 
it seems that such an objection could not possibly prevail. 
A bylaw could further provide that the SNC slate shall be included 
on the corporation’s proxy statement. That provision would require the 
cooperation of the board and the corporate officers who compile the 
proxy statement, but the cost and threat (if any) to the company of doing 
so seem so small that the board could not claim that it would be a 
breach of its fiduciary duty to cooperate. Moreover, even if the board 
tried to exclude the SNC slate from the proxy statement on the grounds 
that, in its business judgment, it was better for the corporation to do so, 
existing SEC rules probably require the board to include the slate. SEC 
Rule 14a-9 prohibits any proxy solicitation “which omits to state any 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false 
or misleading.”189 “An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important . . . .”190 Perhaps the nomination of one or two directors by a 
3% shareholder (as in proposed Rule 14a-11) would not be considered 
important by most reasonable shareholders, but the nomination of a full 
slate by a committee of the company’s largest shareholders clearly 
would be considered important and, therefore, could not be omitted. 
Of course, the board could exhort shareholders to reject the SNC’s 
slate and the shareholders might do so, especially if the board-
nominated slate had access to the corporate treasury for its proxy 
expenses and could dramatically outspend the SNC slate.
191
 However, it 
                                                                                                                     
 189. SEC Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (2011). 
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seems likely that investors would react positively to board candidates 
who would be responsive to shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate executives, lawyers, and scholars have long debated the 
proper role of shareholders in corporate governance of public 
companies. However, until recently all discussion about the 
consequences of shareholder control has been mere speculation because 
it had never been tried. But now shareholder dominance has been 
established in Sweden, and it has been a resounding success. There 
seems to be no reason why it could not be equally successful in the 
United States. The SEC (by rule) and shareholders (by bylaw) could 
provide for the creation of committees of representatives of the largest 
shareholders. These committees would present to the shareholders a 
slate of nominees for the board of directors, as is done in Sweden. 
Shareholders then could either reject this slate and stick with a self-
perpetuating board or choose the shareholder-nominated slate, thereby 
creating a board directly accountable to shareholders. 
It seems likely that shareholders of at least some public companies 
would choose the candidates of the shareholder nomination committee. 
The Swedish experience suggests that such efforts would be very 
successful, in which case they would probably be imitated by nearly all 
public companies. This would result in increased efficiency and 
profitability of American companies, to the benefit of the entire 
American economy. 
 
                                                                                                                     
action similar to that which the Delaware Supreme Court has said could not be compelled by 
bylaw. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. The bylaw could, however, provide for 
reimbursement unless the board concluded that approving reimbursement would breach its 
fiduciary duties. If the members of the shareholder committee independently solicited proxies 
for the SNC slate, they would have to file with the SEC under the proxy rules. See SEC Rule 
14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2011). They might also have to file under the Williams Act. See 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012). 
